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The contingent claims model has been used to value a variety of 
risky debt securities since the seminal work of Black and Scholes 
[1973]. The model is also called the option-theoretic model or the 
structural model. It treats a debt security as a contingent claim against 
the value of an underlying asset.  
In 1974, Merton first applied this methodology to estimate the 
value of a defaultable zero-coupon bond; since then, many authors 
have applied it to value corporate debt. Extensions of Merton [1974] 
include Black and Cox [1976], who incorporate classes of senior and 
junior debt; Geske [1977], who considers bonds that make coupon 
payments; and Ho and Singer [1984], who value bonds with sinking 
fund provisions. Other authors modify Merton's assumption of a flat 
term structure.1  
Despite the substantial literature, the research has been of 
limited empirical success in explaining the price behavior of corporate 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Fixed Income, Vol. 13, No. 3 (December 2003): pg. 42-52. DOI. This article is © Institutional Investor, Inc. and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional Investor, Inc. does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Institutional Investor, Inc.. 
2 
 
debt instruments and their credit risk spreads. Even though the 
contingent claims model is not particularly good at valuing corporate 
debt securities, this approach has become the norm for valuing 
mortgages, as mortgage loan characteristics more readily permit its 
direct application.  
Real estate is usually financed with one debt source, and not the 
frequently complex capital structure of corporations. Mortgages also 
typically use a single asset as collateral and have relatively 
homogeneous contract terms. Because of this simpler capital structure 
and one collateral source, borrower default decisions and the 
foreclosure procedures for real estate are easier to model using the 
contingent claims approach.  
Real estate researchers first used the contingent claims model 
to assess prepayment and default risk in residential mortgages. The 
commercial mortgage literature follows the history of the residential 
mortgage literature but lags it by approximately a decade, mainly 
because commercial mortgage data are limited. Applying the 
framework established in the residential mortgage literature, most 
commercial mortgage pricing studies assume a rational borrower 
defaults when the property value drops below the market value of the 
mortgage.2  
These studies tend to ignore some key differences between 
residential mortgages and commercial mortgages. First, commercial 
mortgages are used to finance income-producing properties. 
Therefore, a borrower's default decision depends on not only the asset 
value (i.e., investor equity) but also the property liquidity (i.e., 
property income). A rational borrower would not default when property 
net cash flow is positive, even if the owner's equity position is 
negative. To properly reflect a rational borrower's default decision, a 
pricing model for commercial mortgages needs to include both 
property value and property income as default triggers.3  
Second, unlike residential mortgages that are typically fully 
amortizing, most commercial mortgages are partially amortizing; that 
is, a balloon payment is due when the mortgage matures. Typical 
commercial mortgages have a 7-to 12-year term and a 25- to 30-year 
amortization schedule. Borrowers usually fund the balloon payment by 
refinancing the current mortgage. Even a borrower in good standing 
during the term of the mortgage might be unable to refinance at 
maturity due to higher interest rates or tighter underwriting standards, 
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among other factors. Pricing models that ignore the impact of balloon 
risk may thus underestimate the overall credit risk in commercial 
mortgages.4  
We use the contingent claims model to assess credit risk in 
commercial mortgages. Rather than assume a single default trigger 
based on property value (measured by contemporaneous loan-to-
value, LTV), our model incorporates a second trigger based on 
property income (represented by contemporaneous debt service 
coverage, DSC). We also explicitly consider balloon risk as a second 
source of credit risk in commercial mortgages.  
Our findings reveal that the effect of a property income trigger 
is significant, and, depending on the size of the property reserve 
account if required, the property income trigger can dramatically 
reduce the estimated credit risk premiums. While the inclusion of a 
second default trigger helps improve estimates of term default risk, it 
is necessary to expand the model to include balloon risk in order to 
assess total credit risk adequately.  
We find that while weaker properties with sizable reserve 
requirements may not default during the term of the loan, thus 
reducing term default risk, they are often unable to meet stricter 
underwriting standards at mortgage maturity, resulting in higher 
balloon risk. Therefore, the current low commercial mortgage term 
default rates may be merely illusion if balloon risk is not appropriately 
considered. This may lead to significant mispricing of both investment-
grade and subordinate classes of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS).  
 
I. Recent Developments in Commercial Mortgage 
Default  
Most studies that examine the impact of default risk on the 
valuation of mortgages, both commercial and residential, focus on 
asset value as the sole default trigger, assuming that borrowers will 
default when the property value falls below the mortgage value. 
Recent theoretical and empirical research, however, suggests that 
asset value is not the sole default trigger, and in some cases not even 
an important trigger.  
Archer et al. [2002], for example, argue that loan-to-value at 
origination is an endogenous risk measure, and suggest there is no 
empirical relationship between LTV and mortgage default. In their 
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investigation of 495 multifamily loans, they find no significant 
relationship between LTV at origination and mortgage default. On the 
other hand, their results reveal that initial property income (measured 
by debt service coverage at origination) is a strong predictor of 
default.  
Ciochetti et al. [2002] further extend the literature by including 
contemporaneous measures of LTV and DSC in their empirical analysis. 
They estimate default and prepayment functions for commercial 
mortgages using a competing risks proportional hazards model and 
loan-level data, and find that an asset value-based model alone cannot 
fully explain default incidence. The authors also reveal that both 
contemporaneous DSC and a binary variable representing balloon year 
show a strong impact on default incidence, indicating the importance 
of including property income and balloon risk in commercial mortgage 
pricing.  
Goldberg and Capone [2002] propose a theoretical default 
model that incorporates both property value and property cash flow to 
predict multifamily mortgage default. They test the model empirically 
using a data set of 13,482 multifamily loans. The results show that a 
double-trigger joint-probability model is better than models with a 
single default trigger (either LTV or DSC). Their findings also reveal a 
sizable increase in default risk in the balloon year, confirming the 
results of Ciochetti et al. and the need to explicitly include balloon risk 
in commercial mortgage pricing models.  
When a borrower is unable to make the balloon payment, the 
lender may either foreclose on the property or renegotiate the loan 
contract. While academic research has shown that negotiating a 
discounted loan payoff eliminates the default costs associated with 
property liquidation or transfer (see Riddiough and Wyatt [1994]), 
evidence in practice suggests that extending the mortgage maturity is 
a more common form of workout (Harding and Sirmans [2002]).  
Harding and Sirmans argue that maturity extension better aligns 
the incentives of borrowers and lenders than principal renegotiation. 
They find that borrowers who expect lenders to renegotiate loan 
maturity to avoid default generally have less incentive to extract cash 
flow from the property during the term of the mortgage, and are less 
likely to take on additional risk, resulting in reduced agency costs.5  
Leveraging these recent developments in the literature, we 
propose a model that considers the interaction of term default and 
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balloon risk in commercial mortgage pricing. In our model, the 
borrower default decision is based on both contemporaneous property 
value and property income, and balloon risk is incorporated in the form 
of maturity extension rather than discounted principal payoff. 
 
II. Mortgage Pricing Methodology  
The most popular methodology for pricing mortgages in the 
academic literature is the contingent claims model, where the partial 
differential equation is solved using a backward numeric method. The 
beauty of this pricing approach is that it recognizes the nature of 
compound default options and explicitly considers the value of these 
options. Under highly restrictive circumstances—e.g., the borrower 
considers only its equity position; the lender forecloses the property 
immediately when the borrower defaults; and there is no lag time 
between default and investment recovery-this is the best mortgage 
pricing method. It becomes very difficult, if not impossible, however, 
to apply this approach when property cash flow, balloon risk, and 
other factors are also incorporated.  
One limitation of the backward numeric approach is that 
computation time increases exponentially as the number of state 
variables rises. Studies applying this approach were limited to two 
state variables until recently (see Brunson, Kau, and Keenan [2001] 
for a mortgage valuation model with three state variables). When two 
default triggers are considered in the pricing model, at least one more 
state variable must be added to account for the volatility of property 
income, making it complicated to solve using the backward approach.  
Another limitation in pricing mortgages using the backward 
numeric method is that terminal conditions must be specified in order 
to work backward in time. Consequently, loan workout, maturity 
extension, delay of investment recovery, and other possible situations 
cannot be properly addressed.6  
Overall, a pricing model that incorporates double default 
triggers and balloon risk is difficult if not impossible to solve using the 
backward approach, so we use a forward Monte Carlo simulation 
approach. Other studies that have adopted the forward mortgage 
pricing approach include Schwartz and Torous [1989a and 1989b] and 
Riddiough and Thompson [1993].  
With the forward pricing model, we use both contemporaneous 
LTV and DSC as default triggers, and consider the possibility of loan 
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extension if minimum mortgage refinance terms are not met at 
mortgage maturity. The Monte Carlo approach is also more flexible 
than the backward pricing method, as it allows factors such as time to 
foreclosure, foreclosure costs, and property income payout rates, 
among other factors, to vary, instead of maintaining a constant value.  
The main criticism of Monte Carlo simulation for pricing 
commercial mortgages is that it cannot explicitly measure the value of 
the borrower's default options. To address this issue, we use the 
default probability function developed by Riddiough and Thompson 
[1993], which replaces sharp borrower default boundaries in rigid 
default models with fuzzy default boundaries. The Riddiough-
Thompson model recognizes the influence of default transaction costs 
on the borrower's default decision and considers the value of default 
options implicitly.  
In this model, default probability is a function of time to 
maturity and net equity level, E, which is the inverse of the 
contemporaneous loan-to-value ratio:  
(1) 
where Pt is the property value at time t, and Mt is the mortgage value, 
which is stated as a function of the current mortgage rate, r.  
Riddiough and Thompson [1993] establish default probability 
rate bounds at mortgage origination, ƒ(E0, 0), and at mortgage 
maturity, ƒ(ET, T), given different equity levels. These bounds are then 
used to determine a default probability function during the term of the 
loan. As a result, the lower the property's net equity level or the closer 
to mortgage maturity, the higher the probability of default.7  
Exhibit 1 graphs the relationship between default probabilities 
and a property's net equity level at 1) origination, 2) halfway through 
the loan term, and 3) maturity.  
 
III. Simulation Model  
To investigate the effect of credit risk on commercial mortgage 
values, we first specify the state variables employed in the simulation 
model. Most contingent claims studies focus on two state variables: 
interest rate and property value. Using the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross 
[1985] mean-reverting interest rate process, the dynamics of interest 
rate variation in our model are specified as:  
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Where κ is the speed of reversion parameter; θ is the long-term 
reversion rate;  is the standard deviation of changes in the current 
spot rate; dzr and is a standard Wiener process. A variety of shapes of 
the yield curve can be described by using a different initial interest 
rate, r0·.  





where Ρ is property value; αΡ is the expected total return on the 
property; βΡ is the continuous property income payout rate; σΡ is a 
volatility parameter of property returns; and dzP is a standard Wiener 
process. To estimate the credit risk premium of commercial 
mortgages, we apply the risk-neutral valuation principle, where the 




and r is the riskless spot rate. It is assumed there is an instantaneous 
correlation between changes in property prices and interest rates, ρΡr 
A third stochastic variable that must be specified in the 
mortgage pricing model is property cash flow. Monthly property 
income is determined by multiplying the property value by the 
property income payout rate. Since interest rate and payout rate are 
correlated, we specify the changes in payout rate as a function of the 
contemporaneous interest rate where:8  
(5) 
where βΡ is the property income payout rate; λ is an estimated 
parameter; r is the interest rate; σβ is a volatility parameter of the 
payout rate; and dzβ is a standard Wiener process.  
In each simulation iteration, random seeds are generated for 
each month over the term of the mortgage. Given the parameters of 
the stochastic processes, spot interest rates, property values, and 
property income are calculated for each month. Values of these 
variables are then used to project borrower default behavior.  
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Borrower default during the mortgage term is modeled using a 
modified Riddiough-Thompson default function, where we include a 
second default trigger, property income. If property income is 
adequate to cover debt service, we assume a rational borrower will not 
default and forgo the positive cash flow and the time value of the 
default options. Therefore, in our double-trigger default model, the 
borrower must incur a negative cash flow position in addition to an 
adverse net equity level to trigger default. In other words, a property 
income trigger event (i.e., a DSC of less than 1.0) is a necessary 
condition of default.  
Furthermore, a borrower is unlikely to default immediately when 
the DSC initially drops below parity. The borrower may fund a debt 
service shortfall through a property reserve account or other equity 
sources until it either becomes illiquid, uses all property reserves, or 
perceives that the negative cash flow is likely to persist and the 
property value is unlikely to recover. Unfortunately, no empirical 
research has examined the extent or the length of property cash flow 
deficiencies before default occurs. In the simulation analysis, we 
consider a series of borrower default criteria related to the 
contemporaneous DSC while also including the contemporaneous LTV-
based default trigger.  
The model also accounts for balloon risk by examining the 
possibility that the borrower cannot make the balloon payment even 
though the mortgage is not in default during the term of the loan. At 
maturity, we estimate the loan amount the borrower is able to 
refinance (i.e., the justified loan amount) based on the 
contemporaneous property value, property income, interest rate, and 
underwriting standards (LTV and DSC). If the justified loan amount is 
lower than the balloon balance, the borrower is presumed to be unable 
to payoff the current mortgage. In this case, the lender and the 
borrower are likely to negotiate a workout.  
We assume the lender will agree to extend the loan maturity, 
while the borrower continues to make periodic payments. At the end of 
each extended month, the mortgage may be: paid off (if the justified 
loan amount exceeds the balloon payment), in default (if both LTV and 
DSC default triggers are satisfied), or extended again (otherwise). It is 
assumed that the mortgage can be extended for up to two years, and 
the borrower will be forced to liquidate the property and terminate the 
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mortgage if neither default nor payoff occurs during the two-year 
extension period.  
Having established the criteria of default and extension, we can 
project the entire cash flow stream throughout the life of the mortgage 
for each simulation path. These cash flows are then discounted on a 
risk-neutral basis to determine the initial mortgage value. A large 
number of Monte Carlo simulation paths are generated until the 
mortgage value converges. The credit risk premium is determined by 
solving for the mortgage contract rate that makes the mortgage sell at 
par.  
 
IV. Model Parameters and Simulation Results  
We use the simulation model to examine how term default risk 
and balloon risk affect the value of a 10-year commercial mortgage 
with a 30-year amortization schedule. To isolate the impact of credit 
risk on mortgage pricing, we assume a non-callable mortgage.9  
Exhibit 2 describes the mortgage terms, interest rate 
parameters, property value processes, property income payout 
parameters, and other variables used in the I simulations. The 
mortgage is assumed to have an initial amount of $1 million, with LTV 
of 70% and DSC of 1.30. In the base case, we consider an upward-
sloping yield curve with = 2.0%, = 25.0%, = 5.0%, and = 8.0%.10  
While the literature generally assumes that property prices 
follow a lognormal diffusion process, there is no consensus on property 
value volatility (σΡ). We test a series of property volatility rates ranging 
from 12% to 22%, and find that the risk premiums estimated using an 
18% volatility are most comparable to those observed in the market. 
This range is consistent with the literature. For example, Titman and 
Torous [1989] use a series of volatility measures from 15.0% to 
22.5%, Riddiough and Thompson [1993] use 12% and 16%; and 
Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996] use 15% and 20%. Therefore, we 
discuss only the simulation results using the 18% volatility.  
The property income payout rate is defined as a function of the 
long-term interest rate, with an initial rate of 6.5% and a standard 
deviation (σβ ) of 0.3%.11 Additional assumptions made in the base 
case simulation analysis include: 1) Average lender loss rate of 15% of 
the mortgage value in foreclosure, with a standard deviation of 5% 
and minimum of 5%; 2) a 12-month investment recovery lag; and 3) 
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investor carrying costs between default and foreclosure of 0.5% per 
month of the outstanding loan balance.  
To separate the impact of term default and balloon risk on 
mortgage values and, more important, to highlight the interaction 
between these two types of risk, we present the simulation results in 
two sections. First, term default risk premiums are estimated using the 
double-trigger default model without considering balloon risk. These 
results reveal the effect of including the property income as a default 
trigger on mortgage pricing. Next, loan extension at maturity is 
considered in the model to determine the impact of balloon risk on the 
overall credit risk of commercial mortgages.  
 
Simulation Results with Term Default Only  
Exhibit 3 presents the simulated mortgage values and default 
risk premiums using the double-trigger default model and 10,000 
Monte Carlo state variable paths without considering balloon risk. To 
highlight how the addition of a second property income default trigger 
(DSC) influences pricing results, we first estimate the mortgage value 
and default risk premium using the single-trigger LTV-based default 
criterion (Model 1 in Exhibit 3). The single-trigger risk premium of189 
basis points in Model 1 provides a baseline for comparing the results of 
adding the property cash flow trigger to the default model.  
The Riddiough-Thompson [1993] default function recognizes 
unobservable borrower default transaction costs, and thus reflects 
what we know to be non-optimal borrower default decisions. To test 
whether the Riddiough-Thompson model adequately reflects borrower 
default behavior indicated by a double-trigger model, we start with a 
less restrictive DSC-based criterion. In Model 2 of Exhibit 3, a second 
necessary condition of default is a negative net cash flow, or DSC < 1. 
The results reveal no significant difference in the mortgage values and 
default risk premiums.  
While the default behavior in Model 2 is plausible, we find it 
unlikely, as most borrowers are able to cover small or temporary cash 
flow deficits to keep the options alive. Generally speaking, when the 
DSC is slightly lower than 1.0, the probability that property net cash 
flow will again become positive is high, and the cost of keeping the 
default options open is relatively low.12 Therefore, the borrower is 
unlikely to default immediately when the DSC drops below 1.0.  
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Thus, we consider more restrictive property income default 
triggering conditions. Model 3 in Exhibit 3 considers three consecutive 
months of cash flow deficits, which reveals a slightly lower credit risk 
premium under Model 1 (6 basis points). Although the difference is 
small, it is statistically significant. The results indicate that explicitly 
considering the DSC trigger is necessary to properly measure the 
credit risk of commercial mortgages.  
A recent trend in commercial mortgage underwriting is the 
requirement of cash reserves or escrows as a cash flow volatility 
buffer.13 With capital improvement, tenant buildout, or property 
expense reserves, borrowers can fund small-to-moderate cash flow 
deficits with these reserve accounts.  
Models 4-6 assume the borrower has sufficient reserves to fund 
a one-month, three-month, and six-month cumulative debt service 
shortfall over a 12-month period, where a one-month shortfall is equal 
to one month's debt service, and so on. The possibility of the borrower 
funding debt service out of a reserve account or out of pocket for the 
cumulative amount of one month or three or even six months' debt 
service is entirely reasonable. Under these conditions, default risk 
premiums drop, and in Models 5 and 6 drop sharply.14  
In Model 4, the one-month debt service deficiency case, the 
estimated risk premium drops to 165 basis points, representing a 24 
basis point reduction from Model 1 (the asset value-only model). When 
the borrower has the ability to fund a three-month cumulative debt 
service shortfall (Model 5), the risk premium shrinks to 112 basis 
points. In Model 6, when the borrower can fund a six-month debt 
service shortfall over the 12-month period, the term default risk 
premium plummets to 17 basis points.  
While these simulated default risk premiums appear low, they 
are consistent with the default rates experienced for mortgages 
originated over the past decade. See Esaki [2002] and the delinquency 
rates compiled by the ACLI.15  
In additional simulations, we also adjust the shape of the yield 
curve, the property payout rate, and loan origination terms, among 
other parameters. We find a similar pattern of default risk premium 
reductions between single-trigger and the double-trigger models.  
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Simulation Results with Both Term Default and 
Balloon Risk  
It is quite plausible that a borrower will be unable to make the 
balloon payment if the current mortgage cannot be refinanced due to 
higher interest rates or tighter underwriting standards, among other 
reasons. In this case, the lender and the borrower are likely to 
negotiate a loan extension. 
At mortgage maturity, a justified refinance loan amount is 
calculated based on the contemporaneous property value, property 
cash flow, interest rate, and underwriting standards (LTV and DSC). If 
the justified refinance loan amount is lower than the balloon amount 
and the loan is not in default, we assume the mortgage is extended.  
Exhibit 4 presents the probabilities of term default, payoff at 
maturity, and extension across the six models in Exhibit 3. As 
expected, default probabilities decline monotonically across default 
models. Interestingly, the percentage of mortgages that are paid off at 
maturity is relatively stable, but balloon risk (the risk of loan 
extension) increases with the borrower's ability to fund property 
income shortfalls. In other words, loans that would otherwise have 
defaulted prior to maturity now reach the balloon payment date; then, 
these weaker properties are less likely to meet contemporaneous 
underwriting standards necessary to obtain a refinancing loan at 
maturity.16  
We further investigate the effect of balloon risk on commercial 
mortgage pricing in Exhibit 5, which presents the simulated mortgage 
values and risk premiums considering a double-default trigger model 
that includes balloon risk, where borrower default behavior during the 
term of the mortgage is the same as in Exhibit 3.  
During loan extension, the borrower is assumed to make the 
periodic debt service payment. At the end of each extension month, 
the mortgage may be paid off, in default, or extended again. Loans 
that default during the extension period have the same loss and 
foreclosure parameters as term defaults. Additionally, it is assumed 
that the mortgage can be extended for up to two years, at which point 
the borrower will be forced to liquidate the property and terminate the 
mortgage if neither default nor payoff occurs during the extension 
period.  
The credit risk premium estimated in Model 1 in Exhibit 5 is 198 
basis points, indicating a 9-basis point balloon risk premium 
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(compared to Model 1 in Exhibit 3). When the second default trigger is 
added in Models 2-6, the balloon risk premium increases, while the 
total credit risk premium rises slightly at first and then drops 
dramatically. As the borrower is able to fund a three-month and six-
month debt service shortfall (see Models 5 and 6), the estimated 
balloon risk premiums are is 51 and 93 basis points, respectively.  
These results reveal an interesting interaction between term 
default and balloon risk. As more restrictive default criteria reduce the 
probability of term default and thus the resulting risk premium (see 
the impact of including a second default trigger across models in 
Exhibit 6), more properties are unable to meet the refinance 
requirements, increasing the probability of extension and the balloon 
risk premium. Consequently, although the double-trigger models 
(Models 2-6) are superior to the single-trigger model (Model 1) in the 
sense that they better simulate borrower default behavior and thus 
improve the estimation of default risk premiums, simply adding the 
property income-based default trigger without considering its 
interaction with balloon risk may introduce a different kind of bias in 
mortgage pricing, one that underestimates the total credit risk 
premium in commercial mortgages.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusions  
We have assessed credit risk in commercial mortgages using a 
double-trigger default model that includes balloon risk. Like other 
researchers, we find property cash flow is an important predictor of 
default, in addition to the property value. We therefore develop a 
commercial mortgage pricing model that uses both asset value and 
property income as default triggers, and apply Monte Carlo simulation 
to estimate the risk premium associated with borrower default during 
the term of the mortgage. The results reveal that failure to consider 
property cash flow significantly changes the probability of default and 
the credit risk premium.  
As most commercial mortgages are not fully amortizing, a 
balloon payment is often required to pay off the loan at maturity. 
While most research on commercial mortgage pricing assumes a 
performing mortgage is immediately paid off at maturity, it is possible 
the borrower will be unable to make the balloon payment if the 
property does not meet contemporary underwriting standards. We 
therefore examine the effect of loan extension and possible default 
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during the extension period on mortgage values and credit risk 
premiums.  
The analysis reveals an interaction between term default and 
balloon risk. As more restrictive default criteria reduce the probability 
of term default and the resulting risk premium, more weak properties 
that would otherwise have defaulted survive to maturity but cannot 
satisfy the refinance requirements, increasing the balloon risk. 
Applying the double-trigger default criteria results in lower to 
significantly lower term default risk premiums, but the effect on total 
credit risk premiums is not as dramatic due to higher balloon risk 
premiums.  
As commercial mortgage originators and underwriters require 
property reserve accounts for capital improvements, tenant buildouts, 
and building expenses as cash flow volatility buffers, term default risk 
is expected to be low. This expected outcome is confirmed by studies 
of commercial mortgage performance by Corcoran [2000] and Esaki 
[2002]. Yet a property with a depressed value and weak income-
producing ability makes refinancing at maturity tenuous. As a result, 
the reduction in term default is likely to lead to an increase in balloon 
risk.  
These results should be of particular interest to CMBS investors. 
As mortgage default may be deferred to maturity, the non-rated and B 
tranche buyers are likely to remain in the pool for longer periods, thus 
enhancing their returns. As term defaults are delayed until maturity, 
however, the risk of loss or delayed payments could work its way up 
the subordination levels to investment-grade tranches. As a result, a 
pricing model that incorporates double default triggers and considers 
balloon risk is critical to accurately assess the credit risk in commercial 
mortgages, particularly those included in CMBS pools.  
 
Endnotes  
1. Shimko, Tejima, and Van Deventer [1993] and Longstaff and Schwartz 
[1995] assume that short-term risk-free rates follow a Vasicek 
process; and Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan [1993] use a Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross [1985] model for short-term rates.  
2. These studies include Kau et al. [1987], Titman and Torous [1989], and 
Childs, Ott, and Riddiough [1996], among others.  
3. If property value and property income are perfectly correlated, separate 
modeling of property income is unnecessary, but experience suggests 
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this is not the case. The correlation between the National Council of 
Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) property net operating 
income (NOI) growth rate and capital return in the period 1978 to 
2002 was less than 0.5. Also, if property NOI and value are highly 
correlated, capitalization rates should remain stable over time. 
American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) data on capitalization rates 
over the same time period ranged from 8.3% to 13.7% with a 
standard deviation of 1.24%.  
4. Tu and Eppli [2002] estimate the probability of balloon risk and its 
associated losses to the lender. They find balloon risk is sensitive to 
property cash flow volatility and changes in underwriting standards 
between loan origination and maturity.  
5. These two types of agency problem are referred to as underinvestment and 
overinvestment by Gertner and Scharfstein [1991]. The agency issues 
are based on the work by Jensen and Meckling [1976] and Myers 
[1977].  
6. Studies using the backward approach assume that a certain proportion of 
the property value will be recovered immediately in the event of 
default. In reality, both the amount and the timing of investment 
recovery are uncertain.  
7. Riddiough and Thompson use a quadratic weighting system to determine 
the default probability function for a commercial mortgage. For 
example, when a loan is halfway through its term, the lower bound is 
weighted 75% (1 – 0.52) while a 25% weight is placed on the upper 
bound (0.52).  
8. Since data on commercial property income payout rates are not available, 
we estimate the relationship between payout rates and interest rates 
using property capitalization rates as a proxy. A regression of 
capitalization rates on mortgage contract rates is estimated using ACLI 
data, similar to the approach employed by Goldberg and Capone 
[2002].  
 
9. Commercial mortgage pricing studies have generally presumed non-
callable mortgages (for example, see Titman and Torous [1989]; 
Riddiough and Thompson [1993]; and Childs, Ott, and Riddiough 
[1996]). Most commercial mortgages have lockout periods and strict 
prepayment penalties in the form of defeasance and yield maintenance 
prepayment penalties.  
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10. These parameters are consistent with studies on commercial mortgage 
pricing, and the resulting yield curve resembles the Treasury yield 
curve observed in early 2003.  
11. The initial payout rate is a function of the long-term interest rate where: 
βΡ = α + λr. Using ACLI data on mortgage interest rates and property 
capitalization rates, we estimate that α = 4.8% and λ = 0.45. 
According to the Cox-Ingersoll Ross [1985] process and r0, the initial 
ten-year interest rate is approximately 3.8%.  
12. For example, the monthly cost of maintaining the option of future cash 
flows and property appreciation is 0.054% of the loan amount, when 
the DSC drops to 0.90 for a loan with 6.50% mortgage constant. In 
other words, multiplying the monthly mortgage constant of 0.54% by 
0.10 (e.g., 1 – DSC) returns a monthly debt service shortfall of 
0.054% of the loan amount, which is the cost of keeping the options 
alive each month.  
13. For example, see the Fitch Commercial Mortgage Presale Report, GE 
Capital Commercial Mortgage Corp., Series 2003-C2. The summary 
statistics on page 2 reveal that 82% of all mortgages in the pool have 
capital reserve requirements, and 87% have up-front or ongoing 
expense reserve requirements.  
14. With a 6.50% mortgage constant, the 12-month cumulative cost of 
keeping the option open is 3.25% of the loan amount in the most 
restrictive 6-month cash flow shortfall case.  
15. Esaki [2002] reports that average annual default rates (not risk 
premiums) for recently originated commercial mortgages were 
between 0.07% and 0.59% for loans originated between 1991 and 
1995 (i.e., in the fifth to ninth year of the loan term).  
Over the past three years, ACLI commercial mortgage 
delinquency rates have hovered around 30 basis points, with a 
December 2001 delinquency rate of12 basis points. If approximately 
30% of delinquent loans default, and the loss rate on default is 
approximately 35% of the outstanding loan balance, commercial 
mortgage loss rates should average less than 10 basis points over the 
last three years for ACLI loans. 
 
16. Note that while the mortgage values and risk premiums are estimated in 
a risk-neutral framework, default and extension probabilities must be 
stated in real terms. Hence, an expected property total return (αΡ) is 
necessary. In the simulation, we assume αΡ = 11.0%.  
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Exhibit 1: Default Probability as Function of Property Net Equity Level  
Image unavailable due to third-party copyright restrictions. Please see 
definitive published version to view image:  
Tu, C. C., and M. J. Eppli. (2003.) “Term Default, Balloon Risk, and Credit 
Risk in Commercial Mortgages.” Journal of Fixed Income, 13(3): 42-52. 
 
Exhibit 2: Parameter Values in Monte Carlo Simulations 
 
a Mortgage underwriting standards at loan origination and at maturity.  
b Property value is calculated based on mortgage amount and original LTV.  
c The initial payout rate is a function of the long-term interest rate where:  
βΡ = α + λ r 
Using ACLI data on mortgage interest rates and property capitalization rates, we 
estimate that α = 4.8% and λ = 0.45. Based on the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process and r0, 
the ten-year interest rate is approximately 3.8%. 
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Exhibit 3: Monte Carlo Simulation Results—Mortgage Values and Risk 
Premiums Assuming Term Default Only 
 
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
Exhibit 4: Probabilities of Term Default, Payoff, and Extension 
 
Probabilities are estimated in real terms, assuming an expected property total return, 
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Exhibit 5: Monte Carlo Simulation Results—Mortgage Values and Risk 
Premiums Assuming Term Default and Balloon Risk 
 
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
Exhibit 6: Interaction of Term Default and Balloon Risk 
 
 
 
 
